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DC Teacher Incentives

Summary:
Michelle Rhee's tenure as Washington DC's Chancellor of Public Schools was controversial mostly because she instituted reforms designed to hold teachers accountable for classroom performance. This episode provides the backdrop for studying the role of high-powered incentives linked to multiple measures of teacher performance. The effectiveness of one of these reforms have recently been analyzed by Thomas Dee and James Wyckoff in their paper "Incentives, Selection, and Teacher Performance: Evidence from IMPACT." So how did it do? From the abstract: Our RD [Regression Discontinuity] results indicate that dismissal threats increased the voluntary attrition of low-performing teachers by 11 percentage points (i.e., more than 50 percent) and improved the performance of teachers who remained by

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Michelle Rhee's tenure as Washington DC's Chancellor of Public Schools was controversial mostly because she instituted reforms designed to hold teachers accountable for classroom performance. This episode provides the backdrop for studying the role of high-powered incentives linked to multiple measures of teacher performance. The effectiveness of one of these reforms have recently been analyzed by Thomas Dee and James Wyckoff in their paper "Incentives, Selection, and Teacher Performance: Evidence from IMPACT." So how did it do? From the abstract:
Our RD [Regression Discontinuity] results indicate that dismissal threats increased the voluntary attrition of low-performing teachers by 11 percentage points (i.e., more than 50 percent) and improved the performance of teachers who remained by 0.27 of a teacher-level standard deviation. We also find evidence that financial incentives further improved the performance of high-performing teachers (effect size = 0.24).

So screening mitigated both the adverse selection and the moral hazard problems and not by small amounts.

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