One of the enduring themes of out textbook is that to give employees enough information to make good decisions--and the incentive to do so--what we call "goal alignment," you have to tie pay to performance. The not only attracts the most productive workers (adverse selection) but also motivates them to work hard once they arrive (moral hazard). The tradeoff is that you expose the employees to risk, for which they have to be compensated.The Nobel in Economics was just awarded to two economists who have figured out how best to do this. Our friends at Marginal Revolution wrote a nice essay summarizing their contributions:Use all signals of productivity to better measure performance ("informativeness principle"). Put greater weights on the best measures (least noisy). Use a higher base
[email protected] (Luke Froeb) considers the following as important: 01. Introduction: What this book is about, 19: The Problem of Adverse Selection, 20 : The Problem of Moral Hazard, 21: Getting employees to work in the firm’s best interests
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[email protected] (Luke Froeb) writes Where does foreign aid go? [HINT: not where it is supposed to]
The Nobel in Economics was just awarded to two economists who have figured out how best to do this. Our friends at Marginal Revolution wrote a nice essay summarizing their contributions:
- Use all signals of productivity to better measure performance ("informativeness principle").
- Put greater weights on the best measures (least noisy).
- Use a higher base salary when employees are risk averse (to compensate them for bearing risk).
- Use relative performance metrics ("tournaments") when employees have similar abilities.
- Use absolute performance metrics when employees do not (otherwise, employees with the most ability will easily win the tournament--without working hard).
We can use this analusis to critique executive pay:
...executive pay often violates the informativeness principle. In rewarding the CEO of Ford for example, an obvious piece of information that should used in addition to the price of Ford stock is the price of GM, Toyota and Chrysler stock. If the stock of most of the automaker’s is up then you should reward the CEO of Ford less because most of the gain in Ford is probably due to the economy wide factor rather than to the efforts Ford’s CEO. For the same reasons, if GM, Toyota, and Chrysler are down but Ford is down less then you might give the Ford CEO a large bonus even though Ford’s stock price is down. Oddly, however, performance pay for executives rarely works like a tournament. As a result, CEOs are often paid based on noise.